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GENDER DIVERSITY AS THE 
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Gender diversity on corporate boards has become a point of emphasis, to the 
exclusion of all other forms of diversity. This paper analyses whether board 
gender diversity might help boards overcome groupthink (i.e. the failure of 
board members to consider alternatives to the dominant view when making 
decisions). This is a significant question because the board is reponsible for 
governance of the company and groupthink is often cited as a hurdle to
effectively performing this role. Thus, the paper first examines the role of the 
board, board decision-making processes and the problem of groupthink, and 
subsequently, the potential of gender diversity to overcome groupthink. It 
concludes that gender diversity on corporate boards might help overcome 
groupthink so long as the women directors are also independent and bear 
‘outsider’ status. However, other forms of diversity like race, education, 
tenure, professional background etcetera might offer the same benefits and 
thus should not be overlooked.
I INTRODUCTION
Board gender diversity has become a popular idea since the global financial 
crisis. The main argument is that company boards, which are mostly 
homogenous, need to be more diverse to ensure that boards make better 
decisions. As former board member of Citigroup, Sallie Krawcheck, recently 
said, ‘had we had more diversity of thought, perspective, education, gender, 
colour, the crisis would have been less severe’.1
The emphasis on gender diversity has narrowed the focus to ensuring that there 
is a mix of men and women on company boards. Many countries, including 
Australia, have introduced regulations in this regard. These regulations have 
mostly been justified with a mix of different policy rationales. The two 
dominant rationales are that gender diversity furthers gender equality, and that 
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it is profitable for businesses to have more women on their boards. The equality 
rationale for introducing laws to ensure more women directors on corporate 
boards is, in essence, that in an equal society, positions of power such as board 
membership, must be equally accessible to both genders.2 The business 
rationale, or the business case, as it is popularly known, canvasses that board 
gender diversity is beneficial for companies. It attempts to show that board 
gender diversity results in increased shareholder value.3 While each of these
rationales have some merit and are worth exploring, it is not the aim of this 
paper to do so. Instead, this paper examines how diversity and more specifically, 
gender diversity, might make boards more effectively fulfil their role within the 
corporation. Thus, it attempts to analyse whether board gender diversity might 
be the antidote to ‘groupthink’ in boards, thus making them more effective.
In Australia, the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations (ASX CGPR), introduced recommendations on board 
gender diversity, in 2010 and subsequently revised them in 2014.4 The ASX 
Listing Rules require that all companies listed on the ASX must provide a 
statement in their annual report regarding the extent to which these 
recommendations have been complied with and where they have not been 
complied with, the statement must explain why this is the case.5 However, the 
rationale for such measures in Australia, like in many other jurisdictions, 
remains vague and lacks adequate detail. The ASX CGPR very briefly mentions 
the rationale for the introduction of gender diversity provisions. It cites studies 
which show a correlation between board gender diversity and financial 
performance. It also suggests that the promotion of gender diversity widens the 
pool of candidates considered for board positions. Finally, it states that 
promoting gender diversity could result in enhanced reputation for the company 
along with ensuring a closer connection with customers.6 While there is some 
merit in each of the above arguments, none of them speak directly to the most 
important role of the board of directors within a corporation: corporate 
governance. It is the effect of board gender diversity on this critical function of 
the board that needs to be outlined in more detail for both companies and 
shareholders to be incentivised to petition for gender diversity. 
This paper analyses if, and how, board gender diversity might help boards work 
more effectively. It does so by first examining the role of the board, board 
decision-making processes and the problem of groupthink, and subsequently, 
the potential of gender diversity to overcome groupthink. The concept of 
groupthink (i.e. the failure of board members to be able to consider alternatives 
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to the dominant view when making decisions) draws from psychology and its 
use by corporate scholars and policy makers is still in its infancy. This paper 
offers a significant contribution to board gender diversity scholarship by 
presenting a detailed examination of groupthink in the context of corporate 
boards. Another contribution of this paper is its focus on the policy rationale 
that correlates with the corporate boards’ most significant role as an instrument 
of governance.
This paper begins by examining the role of the corporate board in large public 
listed companies (Section II). Section III focuses on board decision-making 
processes and the possible effects of the board’s composition on the quality of 
decision-making. Section IV explores the concept of groupthink and its 
applicability to company boards. Section V considers how board diversity might 
help overcome groupthink, thus strengthening the board’s monitoring role. The 
final section is the conclusion which canvasses the idea that other forms of 
diversity might also benefit boards, and contends that there is a need to widen 
the board diversity debate to include other forms of diversity.
 
II THE CORPORATE BOARD 
The contentious nature of the board gender diversity debate is better understood 
with an analysis of the theoretical foundations underpinning company law. For 
instance, a recent bill proposing quotas for women on the boards of Swedish 
companies was opposed on the grounds that ‘mandatory gender quotas are an 
unacceptable interference with ownership rights.’7 Similar arguments against 
board gender quotas have been made in most other countries. Thus, the notion 
that shareholders are the owners of the company is deeply ingrained in our 
understanding of the corporation, despite the fact that there are competing 
theories.8 Accordingly, much of the literature seeking to promote board gender 
diversity attempts to appeal to the ‘corporation as property of shareholders’ 
conception by examining the effect of women directors on the profitability of 
the company. However, the question that must be asked is whether the board of 
directors in the modern company should be directly involved in generating 
profits. It would be more pertinent to understand what the corporate board is 
legally required to do and how it is done, in other words, the function of the 
board and board processes.
The board of directors is the centre of corporate governance with corporations 
being managed ‘by and under the direction of’ the board of directors.9 The term
‘corporate governance’ has been defined as the system by which companies are 
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governed and controlled.10 The board of directors is central to the functioning 
of the company and the functions they are meant to perform can largely be 
understood under the three headings of strategy, monitoring and providing 
access to networks. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, published 
in 2004, briefly states that the role of the board is to provide strategic guidance 
to the company, to be an effective monitor of the management, and to be 
accountable to the company and its shareholders.11
However, our conception of the role and functions of the board of directors has 
evolved over time. The historic role of directors was to ‘manage’. As large 
corporations with dispersed shareholders became the norm, the role of the board 
of directors slowly evolved into ‘oversight’, that is the hiring and firing, 
supervision and compensation of officers appointed with the specific task of 
management.12 This shift still allowed the board to engage with questions of 
strategy and to act as a sounding board for the CEO and other senior 
management.13 Today, the main function of the board of directors is still 
oversight or monitoring of management, although contemporary boards also 
tend to be involved in broad policy issues and in networking.14
A Monitoring
The theoretical basis for the monitoring role of the board is provided by agency 
theory, which, in turn, is informed by shareholder primacy theory. One defining 
feature of the modern corporation, as identified by Berle and Means, is the 
separation of ownership and control.15 In other words, where shareholders, who 
own equity in the company, tend to be comprised of a large number of widely 
dispersed individuals who are distinct from the executives or managers in 
control of the corporation. Agency theory is premised on the idea that this 
separation gave rise to agency problems since the principals (shareholders) are
not in a position to directly oversee the agents (managers) in order to ensure that 
they are acting in the principals’ best interests. More specifically, costs (i.e. 
agency costs) would be involved in ensuring that agents acted in the principals’
best interests.16 According to Hansmann and Kraakman, one of the main 
purposes of corporate law is to address the agency problems present in a 
corporation. They suggest that the agency problem in the corporate setting arises
because the agent (manager) has more information about the governance issues 
than the principal (shareholders). Given this information asymmetry, the 
principal cannot ensure that the agent’s performance was exactly what was 
agreed upon without cost. Thus, the agent has an incentive to not perform 
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Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 The Journal of Financial Economics 308.
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optimally or to divert to himself/herself what was promised to the principal.17
The board of directors is one mechanism through which agency costs are 
mitigated.18 Thus, since agency theory views shareholders as the owners and 
hence aims to address the agency problems that would disadvantage 
shareholders, it can be considered an extension of the shareholder primacy and 
the nexus of contracts models of the corporation. 19
The emphasis on the monitoring role of the board can be traced back to Melvin
Eisenberg’s model for reform in 1976.20 His proposal came in the wake of 
opposition at the time, to corporate practices relating to the Vietnam War, 
environmental protection, occupational safety and equal employment. A 
number of corporate collapses also put the spotlight on corporate boards and 
many studies indicated that boards were no longer able to check CEO power.21
In fact, some of the issues identified by these studies are still considered 
pertinent today. Such studies suggested that outside directors were not effective 
monitors since they were usually chosen from the same social networks as top 
executives and since they were likely to be sitting with them on other 
companies’ boards. This familiarity made it unlikely that so-called outside 
directors would challenge the decisions of top executives.22 Further, in a 
landmark study by Mace, a majority of interviewees indicated that director
‘prestige’ was the main criteria on which selection of outside directors was 
based.23 The study also found that directors simply did not meet often enough,
and that relevant information was often not circulated to the board before board 
meetings.24
At the time, the corporations’ statute in each state in the US and many other 
countries provided that the role of the board was to manage the corporation. 
However, Eisenberg, in his famous book, The Structure of the Corporation,
explained the difference between provisions in law and what tended to happen
in practice. At the time, corporations had become such large entities that in 
practice, the board of directors could not manage the day-to-day operations, 
especially when the board was largely comprised of non-executive directors. 
Instead it was the executives involved in management who initiated policy 
decisions. The board’s role often seemed to be limited to ‘receipt and 
consideration of after-the-fact reports’.25
                                                     
17 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2004) 21. 
18 Jensen & Meckling, above n 16.
19 J Robert Brown and Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only in: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability 
Provisions, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 Indiana Law Review 285 (2009).
20 Melvin A Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (Little Brown & Co, 
1976).
21 Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, ‘The Import of History to Corporate Law’, (2015) 59, Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 688–89; See also Roberta S Karmel, ‘The Independent Corporate 
Board: A Means to What End?’ (1984) 52 George Washington Law Review 534, 542.
22 Karmel, Ibid 534, 542.
23 Joel Seligman, ‘A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of 
Corporate Governance Project’ (1987) 55 George Washington Law Review 328–35: citing 
Miles M Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Harvard University Press, 1971).
24 Ibid 332, 328–35.
25 Eisenberg, above n 19, 40, 141.
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Eisenberg proposed that the board should have a primary monitoring function—
with responsibility for supervising, monitoring and selecting executive 
management. He also proposed that laws should ensure the effective 
performance of these functions by the board by making the board independent 
of the executives whose performance they monitor, and by ensuring that the 
board receives adequate and objective information to enable it to perform this 
function.26 Based on Eisenberg’s and other similar recommendations27, the 
American Law Institute (ALI) in its 1984 proposal sought to enhance the 
monitoring (or oversight) function of the board.28 Ultimately this resulted in a
focus on increasing the number of independent directors on the board rather than 
any substantive changes to directors’ duties.29
Similar changes took place in the UK as well which is reflected in the Cadbury 
Report, published in 1992, emphasising the need for non-executive directors to 
perform a monitoring role. It states that the board of directors is responsible for 
the governance of the companies where ‘governance’ is defined as ensuring that 
boards are responsible for: ‘setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the 
leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business 
and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship’.30
To contextualise this for the unitary board system followed in the UK, the 
Report also distinguished between the different roles of executive and non-
executive directors. While it could be assumed that executive directors would 
have detailed knowledge of the business, non-executive directors would bring a 
broader, alternative view to the company’s activities.31 Non-executive directors 
would be responsible for reviewing the performance of the board and of the 
management; and for taking the lead when potential conflicts of interest arose.32
It is worth noting that the Cadbury Report stressed the need for non-executive 
directors, in line with their duty of reviewing the work of the board and of the 
management, to make their views known to the chairman.33 The Cadbury Report 
also recommended that non-executive directors should be of such ‘calibre and 
number’ that ‘their views will carry significant weight in the board’s 
decisions’.34
In Australia, the 1995 Bosch Committee placed substantial emphasis on 
monitoring in its long list of board functions.35 Following this, the decision in 
AWA v Daniels36 echoed the American realisation that companies had become 
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27 Mitchell, above n 20, 690.
28American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 
(Tentative draft No. 2, 1984) § 3.04.
29 Mitchell, above n 20, 689, 690.
30 Cadbury Report, above n 10, 2.5. See generally, Sandeep Gopalan and Katrina Hogan, ‘Ethical 
Transnational Activity at Home and Abroad: A Proposal for Reforming Continuous Disclosure’
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31 Ibid 4.1
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33 Ibid 4.5.
34 Ibid 4.11.
35 Farrar, above n 12, 351 citing H Bosch (ed) Corporate Practices and Conduct (FT Pitman 
Publishing, Melbourne, 1995) 8–9.
36 ACSR 7 (1992) 759.
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too big to be managed by the board except in relation to ‘matters of high 
policy’.37 However, the Hilmer Committee, which published its corporate 
governance report in 1993, stated that the main functions of the board were 
monitoring and corporate performance.38 The first edition of the ASX Principles 
of Corporate Governance, speaking to listed companies, provided that the board 
of directors is responsible for strategic guidance and effective oversight of 
management.39
To reflect the emphasis on the monitoring function of the board of directors, the 
legislation regulating corporations in most countries currently states that the 
business of the company is to be managed by or under the direction of the 
directors.40 The phrase ‘under the direction of’ was a later addition in most of 
this legislation to reflect this shift in understanding the board’s role. In agency 
costs language, the monitoring of management by independent directors plays
an important role in minimising agency costs between managers and 
shareholders. 
What follows from this premise is an assumption that boards with a majority of 
independent directors increase company performance because of reduced 
agency costs. However, the results of empirical studies on this issue are 
contradictory and far from unequivocal.41 Some scholars have responded to the 
contradictory results with the suggestion that ‘one size does not fit all’,
contending that it may not always be necessary to have a majority of
independent board directors.42 Bhagat and Black suggest that a moderate 
number of insiders on the board might add value although they add a caveat that 
their results on this might not be robust.43 It could also be argued that company
performance is dependent on a number of factors, not merely the board of 
directors. 
The collapse of Enron, WorldCom and other companies during and after 2008 
re-opened the debate about board effectiveness. Many companies that collapsed 
around this time had complied with relevant stock exchange rules which 
required boards to have a majority of independent directors. Despite this, the 
boards failed to perform their monitoring role.44 While the response after the
                                                     
37 Ibid 166–67.
38 Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company 
Performance (Information Australia, 1998).
39 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, 1st
ed, Australian Securities Exchange, 2003, Principle 1. See generally, Sandeep Gopalan and 
Katrina Hogan,  Ethical Transnational Activity at Home and Abroad: A Proposal for 
Reforming Continuous Disclosure, 46 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 1 (2015) 15–17.
40 For instance, s 198(A) (1) of the Corporations Act, 2001 (Australia) provides that: ‘The 
business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of the directors’.
41 See generally Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, ‘The Uncertain Relationship between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance’ (1999) 54 Business Lawyer 921 which is a meta-analysis 
of the many studies on the issue. 
42 Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 198.
43 Bhagat and Black, above n 40, 954, 955.
44 Marlene A O’Connor, ‘The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink’ (2003) 71 University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 1233; Erica Beecher-Monas, ‘Marrying Diversity and Independence in 
the Boardroom: Just How Far Have You Come, Baby?’ (2007) 86(2) Oregon Law Review 373.
92 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW        VOLUME 22
 
financial crisis mostly involved tightening ‘independence’ requirements, board 
gender diversity is slowly gaining traction as a possible way to strengthen board
effectiveness. Section V explores this proposition.
B Broad Managerial Decisions
Historically, ‘managerialism’ or the board’s managerial functions were 
emphasised. Under the ‘managerialism’ theory of the board, the board was seen 
as part of the managerial structure of the corporation, and consisted mostly of 
executive directors. Under this model, the main duties of the board included 
providing advice to the CEO, strategic planning and review of significant 
corporate transactions,45 and it was considered important to have corporate 
executives familiar with company business and strategies (i.e. not independent 
directors).46 Thus the prominence of independent directors only started with the 
rise of the monitoring model of the board of directors.
However, as this discussion so far shows, the board’s monitoring role has 
evolved into the most important function of the board. Even under the 
monitoring model, the board is still required to approve important business 
decisions and to advise management on broad policy issues.47 Further, 
individual board members often provide advice and guidance to top
management on operational and policy issues.48
C Resources and Networks
The board also provides access to networks or contacts that the corporation 
might find beneficial. Relational theory emphasises this role of the corporate 
board, and provides an alternative to agency and contractual theories of the 
corporation.49 Relational theory posits that the board of directors helps the 
corporation gain access to essential resources (i.e. information, advice and 
contacts).50 In other words, the corporation utilises board membership to secure 
resources for the corporation.51
                                                     
45 Jill E Fisch, ‘Corporate Governance: Taking Boards Seriously’ (1997) 19 Cardozo Law Review
272.
46 Ibid 274.
47 Bainbridge, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Oxford Scholarship Online, 
2012), 46.
48 Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ 
(2002) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 547, 550.
49 Lynne L Dallas, ‘Two Models of Corporate Governance’ (1988) 22 University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 19.
50 Lynne L Dallas, ‘The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors’ 
(1996) 22 Journal of Corporate Law 1, 10.
51 Dallas, above n 48.
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III BOARD DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND
COMPOSITION
This section focuses on board decision-making processes and how board 
composition might positively or negatively influence the quality of decision-
making. A crucial aspect to note about boards is that they are not merely an 
aggregate of individuals but rather a complex group which develops their own 
culture of decision-making. Therefore, to understand board processes, it is 
necessary not only to understand individual directors’ motivations but also the 
group’s dynamics and motivations.52
The rationale for having a group of directors on the corporate board rather than 
a single individual is that groups often make better decisions than individuals.53
Drawing from behavioural economics literature, Bainbridge has summarised the 
strengths and weaknesses of group decision-making versus individual decision-
making. While individuals are usually superior to groups when matters of 
creativity are involved, individuals are also likely to become wedded to their 
plans and therefore fail to see any flaws that others might identify. This 
‘overconfidence bias’ can be diffused by group decision-making. It follows that 
groups are superior to individuals at evaluative tasks. This is because group 
decision-making would presumably check individual overconfidence by 
providing critical assessment and alternative viewpoints.54 This is consistent 
with the board’s role of advising management where required and more 
importantly monitoring management excesses. The section of the Model 
Business Corporations Act in the US which deals with meetings of the board of 
directors explains in the corresponding commentary that ‘consultation and 
exchange of views’ is an integral part of the functioning of the board of 
directors.55
The question that arises is what the ideal composition of the board of directors 
should be, to ensure that the board’s role is best fulfilled. As already noted, by 
the early 1990s, the consensus was that boards should mostly consist of 
independent directors. When Eisenberg suggested that boards were unable to 
directly ‘manage’ the corporation as was expected of them by law at the time, 
he identified some ‘critical constraints’, one of which was the composition of 
the board. In his opinion, it was striking that the typical board at the time 
‘included persons who were economically or psychologically dependent upon 
or tied to the corporation’s executives particularly its chief executive’.56
Another problem Eisenberg identified was that executive directors populated 
most of the board. While executive directors who reported to the CEO could not 
be expected to disagree or challenge management decisions, Eisenberg noted 
that even outside directors were not totally independent of the CEO. This was 
because most outside directors were lawyers, investment bankers or commercial 
bankers who were also suppliers of services to the corporations on whose boards 
they sat. The rest of the directors were psychologically tied to the chief 
                                                     
52 Rakesh Khurana, Searching for the Corporate Saviour, 82 (Princeton University Press, 2002).
53 Bainbridge (2008), above n 41, 82–94, citing numerous experimental studies on the issue.
54 Ibid 97.
55 Ibid 82.
56 Eisenberg, above n 19, 144, 145.
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executive because they were friends or former colleagues, or sometimes both.57
Even if the directors were not financially or psychologically dependent on the 
CEO, Eisenberg pointed out that the selection process ensured that such 
directors were not truly independent of the CEO. This was because outside 
directors at the time were not selected by the board but by the CEO who would 
invariably consider whether the candidate could be counted on ‘not to rock the 
boat’. Further, the fact that the director owed the CEO his/her appointment was 
also a factor in ensuring that the director did not challenge the CEO. It was also 
common for the CEO to fire a director who challenged management decisions.58
Ironically, nearly forty years after Eisenberg’s book was published, the board 
composition debate is still very much alive with some of Eisenberg’s concerns 
still being raised by commentators.
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, one of the key issues of the board 
composition debate has been board diversity.59 While justifications for board 
gender diversity are many, most business case arguments essentially contend
that board gender diversity will make boards more effective. Since the preceding 
discussion has emphasised the role of the board, an effective board can be 
understood to be one that effectively monitors management. While board 
independence has gained acceptance as a remedy for corporate failure, diversity 
has not gained the same level of acceptance, perhaps because of the plethora of 
arguments crowding out the emphasis on board effectiveness.60
Although most boards by 2008 were dominated by independent directors, the 
fact that corporate failures like Enron and WorldCom occurred made it obvious 
that having independent directors was not always effective. Beecher-Monas 
argues that the problem lay in the way relevant legal rules defined 
‘independence’ which mostly focused on ‘financial’ independence but not that 
of ‘the mind’.61 Many scholars have also pointed out that directors are often
socially connected to other directors and CEOs by virtue of their common 
residence in elite neighbourhoods and membership in social clubs and 
professional associations.62 Even apart from this, arguments have been made 
that having independent directors serve long terms can also reduce 
independence since they foster what has been called ‘fictive friendships’ 
amongst directors. This sometimes leads to independent directors hesitating to 
challenge their ‘friends’ on the board.63
                                                     
57 Ibid 146.
58 Ibid 146, 147. 
59 Above n 1. See also ‘Lagarde: What If It Had Been Lehman Sisters?’ The New York Times 
(Online) 11 May 2010 <https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/lagarde-what-if-it-had-
been-lehman-sisters/?_r=0>.
60 Lisa Broome et. al., ‘Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity’ (2011) 
89 (3) North Carolina Law Review 759.
61 Beecher-Monas, above n 43.
62 Khurana, above n 51, 82.
63 See generally, Yaron Nili, ‘The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure’
(2016) 68 Hastings Law Journal 97; See also, Donald C Langevoort, ‘Selling Hope, Selling 
Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics about Stockbrokers and 
Sophisticated Customers’ (1996) 84 California Law Review 627, 654–55. for a discussion of 
‘fictive friendships’.
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Recalling that the rationale for independent directors is to attempt to ensure that 
the board critically evaluate management actions, offer diverse viewpoints and 
actively discuss alternative factual inferences and plans of action, Beecher-
Monas suggests that a diverse board might facilitate this.64 Indeed, according to 
a recent study by Aaron Dhir, some of the outcomes of the gender quota 
legislation in Norway were improved dialogue in the boardroom, better 
decision- making, more effective risk mitigation and crisis management, and 
higher quality monitoring of and guidance to management.65 The argument 
about board diversity resulting in more active boards usually draws from 
theories of social psychology particularly that of ‘groupthink’ applicable to 
group decision-making.
IV GROUPTHINK
Having established that group decision-making is best suited for the board’s 
functions, it needs to be kept in mind that groups themselves can be prone to 
cognitive biases. In the case of cohesive groups such as boards, ‘groupthink’ is 
a common danger. Irving Janis, who is credited with creating the theory, defined 
groupthink as follows:
A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in 
a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides 
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of actions.66
In other words, groupthink is a form of ‘concurrence seeking among members 
of high prestige, tightly knit, policy making groups’.67 Corporate boards are 
high-prestige groups at the top of the corporate hierarchy and are especially 
susceptible to groupthink partly because boards tend to emphasise politeness 
and courtesy sometimes at the expense of oversight.68 Additionally, as
Eisenberg pointed out, CEOs tend to appoint candidates who are not likely to 
‘rock the boat’ and therefore generally discourage a culture of dissent.69 Further, 
it has been found that directors tend to appoint candidates who are more like 
themselves which makes the resulting group very cohesive.70 Thus board culture 
combined with the CEO discouraging dissent makes boards prone to 
groupthink—which is highly likely to impede their monitoring function. 
This might explain the failure of independent directors to effectively monitor 
management in high profile corporate collapses during the 2008 financial crisis. 
According to Janis, groupthink causes groups to believe that their goals are 
based on ethical principles and to stop questioning the morality of their 
behaviour which in turn leads to over-optimism. Further, groupthink tends to 
cause members to ignore negative information and to view messengers of bad 
news as people who ‘don’t get it’ which eventually decreases dissent. As a 
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consequence, members tend to feel overconfident about their decisions. In the 
worst cases, a group afflicted by groupthink arrives at a decision before fully 
evaluating the information at their disposal.71 Thus, groupthink could be 
disastrous in the case of corporate boards that must base decisions on their 
evaluation of information. However, Janis notes that groupthink is not always 
problematic. It could be helpful, for instance, when a group is making routine 
decisions given it saves time.72
Janis’ groupthink theory was well-received in the social psychology literature, 
and is increasingly being referred to in corporate law literature after the 
spectacular corporate failures during and after the early 2000s.73 Case studies 
with respect to the Enron and WorldCom failures concluded that groupthink 
was largely responsible for the failures.74 Even in more recent cases, groupthink 
in boards is apparent. Vice Chancellor Laster in the US, identified groupthink 
as the most important cognitive bias that boards had to be aware of.75
Janis’ theory of groupthink has generated particular interest amongst scholars 
studying diversity on corporate boards.76 It has been argued that race and gender 
diversity on the board might reduce group cohesiveness and therefore help 
overcome groupthink.77 However, before examining this argument, it is 
important to more closely examine Janis’ theory. He explains the antecedents 
and symptoms of groupthink to help identify the phenomenon in different 
contexts as follows.
A Antecedent Conditions of Groupthink
According to Janis, cohesiveness of the group is the first and most important 
antecedent condition of groupthink. He defines cohesiveness as involving 
inclusive feelings that typically promote feelings of wellbeing and happiness 
within a group.78 While this is not always bad, too much cohesiveness may be 
detrimental for decision-making because members of the group tend to avoid 
conflict to reach a consensus quickly.79 Cohesiveness typically arises due to 
strong relationships among members involving an emotional tie. It is not 
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necessary for every member to like each other so long as they share a common 
goal or have strong ties to the leader, or even to a small subset of the group.80
Boards of directors, especially of large listed companies are typically cohesive 
bodies.81
This cohesion is a result of both the selection process for board members and 
the motives of directors in serving on the board. On the one hand, boards tend 
to select members who are similar to themselves82; and on the other, board 
members (including outside directors) often feel beholden to the CEO for being 
appointed.83 Further, directors of public corporations value their membership on 
boards highly because of the prestige and influence of associating with other 
board members.84 In the words of one board member:  
It is in many ways like a club. You have a group of highly respected 
individuals with whom you work with. Each board I work with, has its own 
norms and ways of doing things. We value this … We are conscious that 
being a director constitutes a unique set of roles and responsibilities.85
All of these factors combine to create cohesiveness amongst board members. 
Cohesiveness is further accentuated by the fact that board members tend to be 
culturally and intellectually similar.86 It has therefore been argued in the context 
of the push to populate boards with independent directors, that even if directors 
are financially independent, because of factors discussed above, they are not 
psychologically independent of the CEO.87
Two further antecedent conditions Janis sets out are: an organisation’s failure 
to develop a proper structure with the group88; and decision-making during a 
provocative situational context.89 According to Janis, the probability of 
groupthink occurring is increased if cohesiveness is combined with at least one 
of the other two antecedent conditions.90
With respect to an organisation’s failure to develop proper structure within the 
group, Janis cites four common faults. The first is the practice of insulating the 
issues being discussed by the group from those outside the group. The second 
common fault is when the group has a strong leader who states his/her views at 
the outset and discourages members from taking a contrary view. The third 
common fault is not having established methodological procedures for 
gathering information and evaluating different options. The fourth fault is a lack 
of social, cultural and ideological diversity amongst its members which 
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decreases the likelihood of group members presenting and debating different 
views.
The third antecedent condition refers to decision-making during a ‘provocative 
situational context’ or in other words, decision-making under stress. Again, 
these provocative situational contexts can be understood in terms of outside 
threats and threats from within.91 In the case of a strong leader and where stress 
is caused by outside threats, the members of a group, would tend to quickly 
concur with whatever solution the leader proposes because they are desperate 
to alleviate their stress and cannot think of alternate solutions. Because of this 
tendency, there is almost no debate or analysis during the decision-making 
process which can ultimately lead to poor decisions.92 Other types of 
provocative situational context could be stress caused by inside threats which 
include recent failures of the decision-making group that cause members to feel 
personally responsible, a complex problem that might surpass the competence 
of the members of the group, and when the group is faced with a moral 
dilemma.93 Since each of these contexts might cause members to experience
low self-esteem due to feelings of shame and guilt, the group members quickly 
move towards a consensus as a form of social support.94
Ultimately, groupthink is a defence mechanism for coping with stressful 
decisions within a group. However, Janis also points out that it is not necessary 
for every stressful situation to result in groupthink. If the leader retains an 
impartial and unbiased approach, groupthink can be reduced.95 This is how 
members sometimes rationalise unethical decisions even if each member,
individually, is perceived as a moral and upstanding citizen.
While it has been established that boards tend to be highly cohesive, the other 
two antecedent conditions are also common for corporate boards. With respect 
to ‘failure to develop proper structure’ all four conditions are typical of many 
boards. First, boards of directors are often highly insular bodies with 
information about issues being made available to outsiders only after a decision 
has been made.96 Next, Janis discusses the common scenario of a leader who 
states his/her opinion before members have a chance to make up their minds 
about a given issue. This is typically seen in corporate boards since the CEO not 
only states the issue to be decided but also the view of the management on the 
matter.97 The third issue Janis discusses is the general lack of methodological 
procedures for gathering and evaluating decisions. However, most boards of 
large public-listed companies have set procedures in place for making 
information available to boards, getting opinions from experts, and putting the 
decision to vote. The final fault Janis discusses is lack of diversity in the group. 
This is a problem widely evident in corporate boards across jurisdictions.
                                                     
91 Ibid 258–59.
92 Ibid 250.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid 255, 256.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
2017     GENDER DIVERSITY AS THE ANTIDOTE TO ‘GROUPTHINK’ ON CORPORATE BOARDS 99
 
Most boards of large public companies are likely to have faced the next 
antecedent condition (i.e. provocative situational contexts or crisis situations)
one time or another. For instance, the court in its decision in Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (no 3)98 mentions more than once the high 
pressure that the members of the board were facing. With respect to directors in 
the UK subsidiary of the company, it is noted that although Edwards and 
Birchmore, two non-executive directors of the UK subsidiary, had received the 
clearest legal advice about what was required in order to approve certain 
transactions, they were under tremendous pressure from the concerned banks 
and also the parent company to approve the said transactions.99 Despite making 
enquiries of the inside directors about the solvency of the company and only 
receiving verbal assurances unsupported by evidence in return, Edwards and 
Birchmore went ahead and approved the transactions.100 However, as Lee AJA, 
aptly points out, ‘while that pressure might have made the exercise of 
independent judgement more difficult, the duties of directors remained 
unaltered’.101 Thus it is important to recognise the factors that might impede 
board decision-making in high pressure situations and attempt to curb them.
B Symptoms of Groupthink
Janis sets out eight symptoms of groupthink. The first symptom is explained as 
the ‘illusion of invulnerability to the main dangers that may arise from a risky 
action in which the group is strongly tempted to engage’.102 Each member 
believes that if the leader and each member of the group decides that it is okay, 
then the plan is bound to succeed. This is typical of groups that have been 
consistently successful in the past since they approve even high-risk plans based 
on past successes and also on the perception that the members and the leader 
must be lucky.103 The second symptom of groupthink is the group’s belief in its
inherent morality which causes decision-makers to ignore the ethical or moral 
consequences of their decisions because they perceive that they control the 
moral compass, know what everyone’s best interests are, and are acting for the 
benefit of all.104 The third symptom of groupthink, collective rationalisation, 
refers to a situation where members rationalise any warning signs and proceed 
with risky decisions. In other words, to ‘save face’, groups will attempt to 
uphold decisions already made even if negative information comes to light that 
should prompt them to alter their decision.105
The next four symptoms of Janus’ groupthink theory correlate with the lack of 
dissenting or independent views. The fourth symptom, outgroup stereotyping, 
refers to stereotyping of those within the group who do not concur, and to those 
outside the group. Outgroup stereotyping helps the dominant members within 
the group to believe in the correctness of their own decisions. However, the 
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outcasts within the group face intense social pressure.106 This explains why 
group members are often reluctant to voice reservations about a decision. The 
fifth symptom identified by Janus is the illusion of unanimity. This refers to the 
misconception that the entire group has arrived at a consensus. Typically, a 
group member who believes that the rest of the group has arrived at a consensus, 
wants to avoid being the last to get on board, and takes the consensus view even 
if he/she is not fully convinced. This results in situations where members might 
be too afraid to voice their concerns even if they are aware of problems with a 
particular decision.107 The sixth symptom is self-censorship. Like the previous 
symptom, this also pertains to a situation where members are hesitant to voice 
dissenting views because of their desire to concur with the group. Thus they 
would rather self-censor and remain silent or publicly agree, than raise their 
concerns and be treated as outcasts in the group.108 Direct pressure on dissenters, 
the seventh symptom named by Janis, describes how groups pressurise 
dissenting members. This tends to transform less powerful members into ‘yes 
men’.109
The final symptom identified by Janus, ‘self-appointed mind-guards’, refers to 
the presence of certain members who decide voluntarily to ‘protect’ the rest of 
the group from any negative information. For instance, such a member might 
inform the other members that the leader is not open to criticism, or the member 
might notify the leader when there is even a hint of dissent from a member 
within the group.110
It is important to note that the different symptoms laid out by Janis are not water-
tight compartments, but rather factors that flow into one another. It is common 
to observe many, or all, such symptoms in the context of corporate boards. 
C Groupthink and Corporate Boards—Case Studies
Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery, gave the example 
of the case In Re Southern Peru Copper Corporation Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation111 to discuss cognitive biases (groupthink amongst them) in the 
board’s decision-making process.112 In that case, a special committee of the 
board consisting entirely of independent directors except the CEO was the 
decision-making body. Despite the committee’s composition, in Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s words, ‘somehow, they blew it’.113 Explaining the possible 
reasons why the special committee ‘blew it’, Laster analyses the cognitive 
biases the members were subject to and most prominent amongst the biases was 
groupthink.114 For one thing, when the valuation from Goldman Sachs (expert 
advisors retained for the deal) was ‘uncomfortable’, the committee rejected it 
and asked Goldman Sachs to ‘develop more comfortable but unconventional, 
                                                     
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid 37–38.
108 Ibid 87.
109 Ibid 246.
110 Ibid 88.
111 In re S Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig, 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011).
112 Laster, above n 74. 
113 Ibid 4.
114 Ibid 5.
2017     GENDER DIVERSITY AS THE ANTIDOTE TO ‘GROUPTHINK’ ON CORPORATE BOARDS 101
 
analyses which generated results that conformed to the Special Committee’s 
desire to get the deal done’.115 This is clearly an example of collective 
rationalisation wherein the members of the committee rejected negative 
evidence so as to follow through with their originally intended deal price. 
Further to this, Vice Chancellor Laster suggested that the special committee 
accepted the second opinion of Goldman Sachs (the expert advisors for the deal) 
which was ‘clearly inscrutable’. The Vice Chancellor’s opinion on why the 
board accepted the opinion was as follows: 
I would be shocked if any director understood them. I would also be 
shocked if any Special Committee member raised their lack of 
understanding with their fellow members. I suspect what happened was 
that the analyses looked pretty, were presented in a nice book, and 
generally looked smart and official. They were accepted without any hard 
questioning.116
In this case, there was clearly a lack of debate or discussion which shows that 
the members of the special committee merely sought concurrence even if they 
did not understand what they were approving. Apart from purporting to 
understand the expert analysis, Laster also suggested that for the special 
committee, which had been working on the deal for a long time, failing to close 
the deal would seem like a loss. Instead, members chose to approve the deal 
despite the high risks involved, to avoid the pain of the loss.117 This again points 
to collective rationalisation.
Andrew Howard, in his paper discussing the import of groupthink in corporate 
governance reform, found that groupthink was prevalent even before the 
financial crisis of 2008.118 He cites examples of groupthink in the technology 
industry during the ‘dot com bubble’ and the telecommunications industry in 
the 1990s.119
Similarly, Marlene O’Connor analysed the functioning of the board of Enron 
and identified that groupthink was responsible for the board’s ineffectiveness to 
check management behaviour.120 O’Connor found that the Enron board’s 
cohesiveness was a result of three factors. The first factor was homogeneity 
amongst members. In other words, all the members were from the same social, 
educational and career backgrounds. This homogeneity along with extended 
tenures contributed to high cohesiveness. The second factor was financial 
incentives in terms of stock options and contributions to pet charities of board 
members by Enron added to the board’s feelings of belonging to the elite group. 
The third factor was a corporate culture that promoted loyalty to the Enron 
senior executives, especially the CEO.121 Thus having established board 
cohesion, O’Conner also found the presence of the other two antecedent 
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conditions of groupthink in Enron. With respect to structural faults, one of the
most important faults she named was the lack of impartial leadership on the 
Enron board. The CEO, Ken Lay, was also the board chair and most of the 
independent directors were appointed by him. Besides, the Enron board did not 
have a practice of meeting without the management.122 Another structural fault 
noted was the unquestioning acceptance of expert reports by board members. 
While O’Connor also mentioned problems of groupthink not just inside the 
board but also between the board and various gatekeepers (auditors, lawyers), 
that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.123 With regard to the third 
antecedent condition of provocative situational contexts, O’Connor cites a 
number of events including the waiver of Enron’s ethics codes to allow related 
party transactions.124
O’Connor identified many of the symptoms of groupthink in the Enron board. 
Enron’s commercial success and the fact that it was one of the highest political 
donors in corporate America seemed to support feelings of invulnerability at 
Enron.125 Further, it is evident from some of the senate hearings O’Connor cites, 
that dissent was discouraged. An employee allegedly commented that anyone 
who ‘questioned suspect deals, quickly learnt to accept assurances of outside 
lawyers and accountants’.126 The board’s belief in its inherent morality came 
from the belief that they would enhance social welfare by reducing the role of 
government in the market. Enron’s former CEO is quoted as having said, ‘we’re 
the good guys’ and that they were on ‘the side of angels’.127 One of the Enron 
board members testified that the board approved the deals in question because 
Enron executives were ‘some of the most creative and talented people in 
business’.128
Collective rationalisation, or the tendency to rationalise away negative 
information, was another symptom found in the Enron board. One of the many 
examples O’Connor has cited is that board members either ignored or chose not 
to enquire about what the ‘H’ stood for in the auditors’ report. In fact, ‘H’ stood 
for high risk and a number of transactions had been labelled as such. One 
director testified that he merely viewed ‘high risk’ as meaning ‘important’.129
With respect to outgroup stereotyping, O’Connor cites instances when the 
Enron board approved complex transactions with obvious risks and conflicts 
without asking questions. She attributes this to the attitude of Enron’s 
management to label anyone (including journalists) who asked uncomfortable 
questions that they did not ‘get it’.130 Similarly, the board’s failure to ask 
members of management how much money they made from related party 
transactions points towards self-censorship. In fact, when a member of the board 
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requested information regarding this twice but did not receive the information, 
he simply let the matter drop.131
V BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AS THE ANTIDOTE TO
GROUPTHINK
If boards are indeed susceptible to groupthink, as some of the examples 
discussed in the previous section show, is there an antidote or remedy for this? 
Many suggestions have been made of which diversity is one. Vice Chancellor 
Laster has suggested that boards should be educated about the phenomenon of 
groupthink so that they can be mindful of succumbing to its dangers. He says 
that while directors already know about cognitive biases, they need to be 
reminded.132 A solution recommended to counter groupthink has been to 
appoint a designated ‘devil’s advocate’ who would have the role of arguing the 
opposing (possibly uncomfortable) side.133 Some have argued that the 
requirements for independent directors and the more recent board diversity 
discussion are a diluted version of the devil’s advocate procedure.134
With regard to diversity, what is being sought as a remedy to groupthink is 
members who can offer diverse views. Beecher-Monas has suggested that 
diversity might provide more psychological independence than ‘independent 
directors’ as provided for by current laws. However, she cautions that neither 
race nor gender diversity are necessarily a proxy for viewpoint diversity.135
Considering that CEOs and nominating committees tend to select candidates 
who are similar to themselves, it is possible that they would select women 
candidates or candidates belonging to minority races who mimic white male 
characteristics.136 Thus, while diversity would probably help reduce the chances 
of a board succumbing to groupthink, it must not be merely tokenistic diversity. 
She suggests that diversity together with independence could result in more 
effective boards.137
Some interesting empirical studies have gone beyond merely checking for the 
effect of board diversity on firm performance which gives us a better insight 
into how board diversity might improve board effectiveness. In general, 
commentators take the view that diverse boards make better decisions because 
diverse board members bring diverse views.138 Studies show that educational 
diversity in problem-solving groups improves performance and that teams with 
occupational diversity solve problems faster and more effectively.139 It has been 
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found that in team exercises, individuals prepare better for an exercise with a 
gender diverse group and that a wider range of data inputs are likely to be 
debated, and that the diverse group in the end is more likely to generate a better 
response to the problem.140
This is consistent with the views of Norwegian directors, interviewed in a 
qualitative study by Dhir.141 They emphasised that gender diverse boards 
brought diverse views and perspectives which provided a broader basis for 
decision-making.142 Quantitative studies also suggest that an increase in the 
number of female directors is associated with an amplified discussion of ‘tough 
issues’.143 One explanation for this is that since female directors must overcome 
many systemic barriers to attain board positions, they tend to be highly 
motivated and prepared for meetings.144 Another explanation is that female 
directors typically come from outside the groups and networks most directors 
belong to, and this makes them ‘outsiders’, therefore giving them a different 
perspective.145 In support of both these explanations, a study shows that women 
do not shy away from the ‘tough issues’ in the boardroom because of what is 
called liminality. Liminal persons, in this context, are those in transition 
between ‘out-group’ and ‘in-group’ status. According to this study, since 
women directors have had to overcome barriers to reach board positions, they 
are better equipped to address difficult issues compared to male directors who 
are bound by ‘loyalty norms’.146 The authors of this study, however, also opine
that once women directors’ transition into in-group, they would also be reluctant 
to raise difficult issues.147 Thus, insofar as liminality is responsible for women 
directors’ effect of improved board discussion, this would be a temporary 
advantage. 
The flip side of women directors being able to discuss tough issues is that it 
makes boards less cooperative. Studies have also found that homogenous boards 
are more cooperative and experience fewer emotional conflicts.148 However, 
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under the monitoring model of the board, cooperation might not be as important 
as the ability to be able to question and assess management decisions. Thus, 
Beecher-Monas has argued that diversity could make board psychologically 
independent of the CEO because diversity in the group will make groupthink 
less likely.149
However, for diverse candidates to be able to contribute and make a difference 
to the board, it has been argued that such diverse candidates should have a 
‘critical mass’, that is, the minimum number required to ensure that the 
woman/minority director does not experience the effects of tokenism. The study 
by Erkut, Kramer and Konrad has found that a minimum number of three 
women directors are required to constitute the critical mass. Only when this 
critical mass is reached can these women directors contribute normally, without 
having to face the effects of tokenism.150 A study which interviewed several 
women directors from Fortune 1000 companies, who were the sole woman 
directors of their boards, said they felt visible as lone women. One interviewee 
said, ‘if you are alone, the spotlight is on you.’151 The same study quotes a male 
CEO as saying that when there are three women on the board, no one woman is 
considered to represent an entire gender. He went to say about the three women 
directors on the board of his company that ‘the three women don’t always agree 
with each other, and that is healthy for the men to see … they are 
independent’.152 However, a contrary conclusion was drawn in another study 
conducted by Broome, Conley and Krawiec, who identify a theme of 
interviewees saying they were comfortable being the first and only woman or 
minority directors on the board.153 The critical mass theory was further tested in 
the Norwegian context in 2011 by Torchia, Calabro and Huse who conducted a 
study by analysing the effect of boards with one, two, or at least three women 
directors on organisational innovation. They found that once the number of 
women directors increased ‘from a few tokens (one woman, two women) to a 
consistent minority (‘at least three women’), they are able to effectively 
influence the level of organisational innovation’.154
Putting these various studies and arguments together, what emerges is that 
diverse boards are likely to result in enhanced decision-making because diverse 
people would be likely to bring diverse views about the issues being considered. 
Further, gender diverse boards are likely to be better monitors because diversity 
might help counter the incidence of groupthink and to some extent because of 
women directors’ current status as outsiders. Overall, by improving board 
decision-making and monitoring, board diversity can help boards function more 
effectively.
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VI CONCLUSION
As the previous section sought to illustrate, gender diversity on corporate boards 
might help overcome groupthink so long as the women directors are also 
independent and bear ‘outsider’ status. Further, the emphasis on gender alone 
should not crowd out focus on other forms of diversity like race, education, 
tenure, professional background and other factors. Ultimately, what is being 
sought is members who are not part of the ‘in-group’ and therefore can 
challenge management. Thus, while gender diversity is an antidote to 
groupthink, other forms of diversity are significant as well. It is therefore 
necessary that further research regarding board diversity is expanded to include
a focus on other forms of diversity. Conducting and disseminating such research 
will better educate companies and shareholders about the importance of board 
diversity. 
Based on the dominant theories informing corporate law, this paper has 
identified the primary role of the board to be that of monitoring. Through an
historical analysis, this paper has also found that regulations about the 
composition of the board of directors were aimed at ensuring that the resulting 
board could effectively monitor management. Thus, most boards of directors 
were populated with independent directors in most Anglo-American countries. 
However, an examination of high profile corporate failures like Enron, 
WorldCom, and even the Bell Group in Australia, reveals that independent 
directors alone would not make boards effective monitors. The theory of 
groupthink formulated by Janis was examined to understand how it might 
explain the failure of independent directors on corporate boards to ensure 
effective monitoring of management. Since the application of this theory to 
corporate law is still in its infancy, this article has explored in detail the 
application of this theory by legal scholars in the context of the board of 
directors. Ultimately, lack of diversity being one of the antecedent conditions of 
groupthink, it is not very surprising that diversity is being suggested as a
powerful means to counter groupthink. Board diversity could well improve a
board’s monitoring abilities by countering groupthink and thus ensuring that it 
performs its functions more effectively.
